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INTRODUCTION
When, exactly, does invention occur? That is the question at the heart of
Mark Lemley’s perceptive article, Ready for Patenting.1 Patent law, Lemley
shows, usually treats invention as occurring before the inventor has built a
prototype or tested the new idea, systematically favoring those who quickly
file a patent application over those who do the messy work of actual
implementation.2 Lemley argues that the legal incentives for early filing cause
significant harm, including, most relevant to this Symposium on notice failure,
that patents issued from early-filed applications tend to be overly broad
because the applicant does not yet know how the claimed invention works.3
Lemley offers several recommendations to help solve this problem of
overclaiming. To begin with, he would reduce incentives for early filing by
ensuring that experimental uses or noncommercial sales of an invention (such
as sales to beta testers) do not defeat the inventor’s right to a patent so long as
the inventor is diligently trying to perfect the invention.4 He would also
constrain patent scope directly by, for example, restricting patentees’ ability to
engage in functional claiming, a practice that essentially allows a patentee to
claim to own any technology that solves a particular problem, rather than
limiting the patentee to the particular solution he or she devised.5
Lemley makes a persuasive argument that patent law should, in general,
offer more protection to patentees who build their inventions than it offers to
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. For comments and helpful
discussions, thanks to Jack Beermann, Kevin Collins, Chris Cotropia, Mark Lemley, Mike
Meurer, Rachel Rebouché, and Michael Risch. Thanks also to Ben Greene for superb
research assistance.
1 Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016).
2 Id. at 1172-73.
3 Id. at 1173.
4 Id. at 1194-95.
5 Id. at 1192. For a comprehensive critique of functional claiming in modern patent law,
see Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 905, 908.
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the mere “paper patentees” who never practice their inventions.6 But, as I
explain in the first part of this essay, protecting builders is not without cost.
One of the primary legal incentives for early filing is the rule that, when
several persons seek to patent an identical invention, the first person who filed
a patent application gets the patent.7 That priority rule can dissuade inventors
from building their inventions (at least until they file a patent application), but
it has the benefit of providing a clear, bright-line test. Similarly, although the
experimental use doctrine (which protects experimental uses of an invention
from defeating a patent’s claim to novelty) can encourage inventors to perfect
their invention before seeking a patent, applying that doctrine raises hard
questions about whether a prior use of an invention was genuinely
experimental. To be sure, the social costs of overbroad and underdeveloped
patents that result from the early-filing incentives embedded in current law
may outweigh the costs of the occasional fights over priority and novelty that
would occur under the regime Lemley prefers. But his argument against early
filing would be even stronger if it engaged the tradeoff between clear rules and
fuzzy standards.
Lemley’s critique of functional claiming as a source of overly broad patent
protection is also persuasive, and it has already found traction in the courts. In
June 2015, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc decision, Williamson v. Citrix
Online, LLC,8 that made the relevant law of claim construction more standardlike and less rule-like, offering courts newfound discretion to constrain the
scope of patents drafted in functional terms.9 Building on Lemley’s critique of
functional claiming, the second part of this essay considers the consequences
of Williamson by looking at early district court decisions applying it. Those
decisions confirm that Williamson provides a ground to narrow or even to
invalidate the broadest functional patent claims. But the decisions also show
how the new, standard-like law of claim construction offers courts ample
discretion to maintain the status quo, if they so choose. Moreover, the early
decisions applying Williamson provide a roadmap for future patent applicants
to draft around the Federal Circuit’s opinion and obtain broad, functionally
defined claims.
Accordingly, doctrines outside the sphere of claim
construction, such as the requirement of patentable subject matter under § 101

6

On paper patentees, see generally John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2013).
7 Before the America Invents Act took effect in March 2013, the first person to file
usually received the patent, although the rules governing priority were relatively complex.
See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really
Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1300 (2003) (finding that the last person to file actually
obtained priority in roughly forty percent of disputed cases). Under the simpler priority
regime of the America Invents Act, the first person to file will practically always receive the
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
8 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
9 Id. at 1349-51.
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of the Patent Act, will continue to be important to combating notice failure in
patent law.
I.

EARLY FILING: INCENTIVES, COSTS, AND BENEFITS

Does invention occur upon the mental act of conceiving a new idea? Or does
invention occur only when the inventor builds a working embodiment of that
idea—what, in patent parlance, would be called an “actual reduction to
practice”? Our current patent law treats invention as something closer to
conception than actual reduction to practice. Under the Patent Act of 1952
(which governs all patents whose applications were filed before March 16,
2013), priority generally goes to the first inventor to reduce an invention to
practice without abandoning it.10 Critically, however, the filing of a patent
application counts as a “constructive” reduction to practice that secures an
inventor’s priority.11 Thus, as Lemley observes, “[a]n inventor is better off
filing a patent application as early as possible, before—or perhaps instead of—
building a prototype or testing the invention.”12 The America Invents Act
(which governs all patents with applications filed on or after March 16, 2013)
creates an even stronger incentive for early filing by giving priority to the first
inventor to file a patent application, regardless of who was the first to conceive
the invention or to actually reduce it to practice.13
Lemley questions these strong incentives for early filing. He relies mainly
on the work of Chris Cotropia, who has catalogued several problems with early
filing, including: (1) it results in more patent applications, which adds to the
backlog at the patent office and reduces the quality of examination; (2) it leads
to a greater number of issued patents, many of which will go undeveloped
because of the early stage at which they were obtained; and, most pertinent to
this Symposium, (3) it causes patents to have unclear boundaries because, at
the time of filing, the inventor does not know and therefore cannot describe
how the invention actually works.14 As Lemley elaborates, patents based on

10

See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 426-27 (6th ed. 2013) (summarizing priority rules).
11 Id. The notion that the 1952 Act treats invention as something closer to conception
than reduction to practice is further illustrated by an exception to the rule that grants priority
to the first inventor to reduce to practice: even if an inventor was the last to reduce the
invention to practice, that inventor retains priority if he or she was the first to conceive the
invention and was diligent in reducing it to practice. See Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d
624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
12 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1179.
13 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
14 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187-88 (quoting Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early
Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 70 (2009)).
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guesses about how an invention might work are likely to be broader in scope
than patents based on working models.15
Of course, a patent that does not adequately disclose how to make or use the
invention is invalid due to the Patent Act’s enablement requirement.16 Lemley
argues, however, that the courts have been too lax in enforcing that
requirement, citing cases in which the Federal Circuit has ruled that a patent
can be enabled by mere “prophetic examples”—basically, educated
speculations about how one might make the invention—as well as cases that
allow an inventor to establish priority even if the inventor was unsure whether
the invention would work.17 Although that case law appears troubling, it is
hard to tell if it reflects a systemic problem of overclaiming by patent
applicants. An accused infringer trying to show lack of enablement during
litigation must do so by clear and convincing evidence—a higher evidentiary
burden than applies during examination—which could explain why Federal
Circuit decisions on enablement appear very friendly to patent holders.18
Still, the argument that early-filed patents tend to be broad in scope makes
sense intuitively (although some might contend that broad, early-issued patents
are necessary to ensure further development of the claimed technology).19
Thus, rather than incentivizing early filing, Lemley argues, patent law should
reward those who take the time to ensure that their invention works. One way
to do that would be to eliminate paper patents and require actual reduction to
practice before the patent office is allowed to issue a patent.20 But Lemley

15 Id. Another reason an early-filed patent might be broader than a later-filed patent is
that an early patent applicant has less prior art to avoid and hence less reason to narrow the
claims in the application. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 320 (2003).
16 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring the patent’s specification to “contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same”).
17 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1179 (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40
F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750
F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
18 Indeed, the high standard of proof seemed to play a role in the Atlas Powder decision.
See 750 F.2d at 1577 (“Use of prophetic examples . . . does not automatically make a patent
non-enabling. The burden is on one challenging validity to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the prophetic examples together with other parts of the specification are not
enabling. Du Pont did not meet that burden here.”).
19 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 268-69 (1977).
20 For a recommendation along those lines, see Cotropia, supra note 14, at 120. See also
Duffy, supra note 6, at 1360 (arguing for the revival of a doctrine under which “[m]ere
paper patents . . . were construed narrowly and were more likely to be held invalid” but
“patents successfully commercialized . . . were favored in determining patent scope and
validity”).
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rejects the idea of eliminating paper patents, in part because it is unrealistic.21
The clear trend in the law is to favor early filing, as illustrated by the recent
statutory switch to a first-to-file priority rule. Lemley therefore focuses on a
more modest goal, arguing that the law should, at minimum, not treat patent
applicants less favorably because they tried to build and test their invention.22
At first glance, it is hard to disagree with that argument. The core purpose of
patent law is utilitarian: it enhances social welfare by incentivizing the
development of new and useful technology.23 An invention that has been built
and tested and that works seems more likely to increase social welfare than an
invention that exists only on paper. That said, even if a working model exists, a
good patent attorney will add claims that broaden the patent’s scope as far as
the patent office will allow, so disputes over patent breadth are unlikely to
disappear even if the law were to discourage early filing.
More to the point, figuring out the optimal timing of patent issuance—
should the patent issue upon conception? reduction to practice? sometime in
between?—is an extraordinarily complex endeavor. On one hand, we want
innovative technology to be shared with society as soon as possible, which
helps explain patent law’s emphasis on early filing.24 On the other hand, we
also want the invention disclosed in a patent—and the exclusive rights given to
the inventor—to be tailored to the inventor’s novel and nonobvious
contribution, suggesting, as Lemley argues, that we ought not discourage
inventors from building their inventions before filing their patent application.
Lemley makes a strong case that, whatever the optimal timing of patent
issuance, the law currently places too much emphasis on early disclosure. But
Lemley’s case is not lock-tight, for there remain good reasons to simply grant a
patent to the inventor who wins the race to the patent office. This essay is, to
be sure, not the space to fully consider the many possible justifications for
early filing, but two common justifications are particularly relevant to
Lemley’s article.
First, as Lemley observes, the earlier a patent is granted, the earlier the
patent will expire and the invention will enter the public domain.25 Lemley
concedes that earlier patent expiration is a social benefit that flows from early
filing, and he acknowledges that that benefit undercuts his case against early
filing.26 But I am not sure Lemley should be so quick to make that concession,
for earlier patent expiration might not matter much in the computer-related
21

Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187-90.
Id. at 1191.
23 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1031 (2005).
24 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 878-79 (1990).
25 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1186 (citing John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory
of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2004)).
26 Id.
22
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fields where concerns about overly broad patents are most salient today.27
Given the rapid pace of technological change in computer hardware and
software, the patent term (currently twenty years from the date the application
is filed28) is already longer than the useful life of most inventions.29 Whether a
patented software program passes into the public domain twenty years from
today or twenty-one years from today—as might occur if we encouraged the
inventor to more fully develop the invention before obtaining a patent—seems,
at least on first blush, to be inconsequential.
Of course, one could cite several infamous examples of broad patents relied
upon to assert infringement by technology developed long after the inventor
filed the patent application. The late Jerome Lemelson, for instance, filed
patent applications on barcode technology in the 1950s, but, because of his
strategic use of continuations at the patent office, he was able to assert the
patents against technology developed in the 1990s.30 Similarly, in the 1980s,
an inventor named Charles Freeny conceived of a kiosk for producing music
tapes in retail stores using digital information.31 The patent Freeny obtained,
however, contained claims that were sufficiently abstract to allow a company
called E-Data to assert the patent years later against firms engaged in the quite
different field of Internet commerce.32 Similar instances of overclaiming have
occurred in biotechnology, where holders of patents covering early-stage
research (such as gene fragments) have asserted their patents against laterdeveloped practical applications of that research (such as diagnostic tests or
therapeutic uses).33 Likewise, in the pharmaceutical industry, sellers of brand
name drugs sometimes obtain weak follow-on patents, such as patents on
slightly different formulations, that do little more than extend market
exclusivity.34
All of these examples are consistent with Lemley’s concession that earlier
patent expiration increases social welfare. Recent changes in the law, however,
make similar examples of overclaiming less likely to occur in the future. These
changes at least partly undermine the argument that early patent expiration
27

On the vagueness and overbreadth problems with software patents, see JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 200 (2008).
28 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
29 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (2001).
30 See Karen E. Sandrik, Warranting Rightful Claims, 72 LA. L. REV. 873, 886-87
(2012). The Federal Circuit ultimately held Lemelson’s patents to be unenforceable under
the doctrine of prosecution laches. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. &
Research Found., LP, 422 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
31 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 8.
32 See id. at 67.
33 Id.
34 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1687 n.418 (2003).
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justifies early filing. For example, Lemelson-style “submarine” patents are
now harder to obtain because the patent term is tied to the date the application
is filed rather than the date of issuance35 and because publication of patent
applications is usually required.36 Likewise, as discussed in more detail below,
recent Supreme Court decisions on patentable subject matter have limited the
patentability of broad claims on basic research that can be used to assert
infringement by later-developed applications of that research.37
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that earlier patent expiration should be
irrelevant as a policy goal. Rather, my point is that Lemley might qualify his
concession that earlier patent expiration justifies early filing. In some
circumstances, that is probably true. But in other circumstances, earlier patent
expiration probably does not matter very much because, by the time the patent
expires, the claimed technology is obsolete. Obsolescence before patent
expiration is particularly likely with computer software, the field in which,
again, the problem of overly broad patents is most severe.
A second justification for encouraging early filing—and one that Lemley’s
article discusses only briefly38—is that early filing lends itself to clear rules of
priority and novelty. A first-to-file priority rule, although it incentivizes early
filing, saves the patent office and the courts from conducting context-specific
inquiries to determine whether an invention is patentable and, if so, who gets
the patent. For instance, under pre-America Invents Act law, the person who
was the first to conceive an invention but the last to reduce it to practice could
still claim priority if that person was diligent in reducing the invention to
practice.39 Determining, based on all the circumstances, whether someone was
diligent in reducing an invention to practice is much more difficult than
determining who filed a patent application first. Interference proceedings to
determine priority could last a decade or more40 and cost the parties hundreds
of thousands of dollars.41 A first-to-file rule, though it encourages early filing,
eliminates most disputes over priority.42
35

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
See id. § 122(b) (providing that applications will be published eighteen months after
filing unless the applicant certifies that the invention will not be the subject of an application
filed in another country that requires publication of applications).
37 See infra Part II; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (holding that isolated gene sequences are not patent eligible).
38 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1195 n.123.
39 See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
40 See, e.g., Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
41 See Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543,
570 n.138.
42 Although the America Invents Act eliminated interferences, it created a derivation
proceeding, which allows an inventor to file a petition claiming that a person who filed an
earlier application actually derived the invention from the petitioner and that, therefore, the
petitioner should receive the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2012). The issues the patent office
36

1230

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1223

Lemley also supports a robust experimental use doctrine as a way to ensure
that those who actually build their inventions can still satisfy patent law’s
novelty requirement. But assessing whether a prior use was truly experimental,
like assessing one’s diligence in reducing an invention to practice, requires a
fact-intensive and potentially costly inquiry. Some background: The Patent Act
of 1952 (which, recall, governs all patents with applications filed before March
16, 2013) requires an inventor to file a patent application within one year of
engaging in a public use or a sale of the invention or else the invention is
deemed to have been anticipated and therefore is not patentable.43 Under the
1952 Act, the one-year clock does not begin running if the inventor can show
that the public use or sale was part of an experiment to perfect the invention.44
Although this experimental use doctrine protects inventors who actually build
their inventions, the doctrine is not easy to apply. In a leading case, the Federal
Circuit canvassed its case law and collected thirteen factors that it deemed
relevant to determining whether or not a public use or a sale was
experimental.45
As Lemley notes, there is some debate about whether the experimental use
doctrine survives the America Invents Act.46 If, in fact, the doctrine has been
abolished, inventors will be further incentivized to file early because any
disclosure of the invention will start the running of the one-year grace period.
Although abolition of the experimental use doctrine would, like a first-to-file
priority rule, punish builders and incentivize early filing, it would help avoid
fights over novelty, just as a first-to-file rule helps avoid fights over priority.
The benefits of bright-line rules of novelty and priority are, to be sure,
difficult to quantify. And, although I have focused on the economic costs of
fuzzy standards in this area of law, litigation under those fuzzy standards might
sometimes produce valuable information about how the invention works,

may consider during a derivation proceeding are limited in scope, however. See Courtenay
C. Brinckerhoff, The Limited Scope of the New Derivation Proceedings, PHARMAPATENTS
(Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/10/16/the-limited-scope-of-thenew-derivation-proceedings [https://perma.cc/A6H3-D8MJ]. And, to date, few derivation
proceedings have been instituted. See Michael J. Bruner et al., First PTAB Decisions in
Derivation Proceedings, JONES DAY (Dec. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/first-ptabdecisions-in-derivation-proceedings-12-05-2014 [https://perma.cc/YHG4-8CD2].
43 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), repealed by America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-86 (2011). A similar rule applies under the America Invents Act
in the form of a one-year grace period granted to an inventor who discloses the invention.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
44 See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877).
45 Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
46 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1183-85; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2133.03(e) (9th ed. 2015) (stating that the
experimental use doctrine is “not applicable to applications subject to examination under the
first inventor to file . . . provisions of the [America Invents Act]”).
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getting the invention closer to commercialization.47 More fundamentally, the
costs of occasional but complex disputes over novelty and priority may be
outweighed by the social costs of overbroad and underdeveloped patents that
result from early-filing incentives. But Lemley’s argument in favor of
protecting inventors who build and test their inventions would be even stronger
if it contained a more extensive discussion of the tradeoff between rules and
standards in this area.
In sum, Lemley tells a persuasive story about how legal incentives for early
filing are contributing to a proliferation of overly broad patents. To solve that
problem, Lemley recommends, among other things, strengthening patent law’s
disclosure doctrines, particularly the enablement requirement, to ensure that
inventors are required to disclose precisely how their invention works before
filing a patent application.48 One area of particular concern to Lemley is the
abuse of functional claiming, especially by the owners of patents on computer
software.49 Functional claiming essentially allows software patentees to claim
to own the function of their program, not merely the particular way their
program performs that function.50 If those functional patent claims were
limited to the solutions actually described in the patent’s specification, Lemley
argues, inventors would have a greater incentive to build and test before
running to the patent office.51 By contrast, when functional claims are not
limited to the specific solutions disclosed, the incentive is to file a patent
application as early as possible so that the inventor can secure priority, safe in
the knowledge that the patent’s scope can, in later infringement litigation, be
expanded as necessary to cover the allegedly infringing technology.
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit in 2015 issued an en banc decision that,
consistent with Lemley’s recommendation, appears to restrict the ability of

47 Cf. Cotropia, supra note 14, at 95-96 (discussing how early filing impedes production
of technical information about the invention and of information about any potential market
for the invention).
48 Although Lemley situates his argument for curtailing broad claim scope within the
disclosure doctrines of § 112 of the Patent Act, other doctrines could also be used to control
claim scope. For example, if inventions were required to be not only “practically” useful (as
is the case under current case law applying the utility requirement of § 101) but also
“commercially” useful, broad claims reciting inventions for which there is no market or that
cannot be produced in a cost-effective manner might be found to be unpatentable. See
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1200, 1240-41; see also
Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 103 (2011)
( “Patent specifications that represent significant leaps in usefulness . . . should be entitled to
broader claims.”). And, of course, claim scope can always be altered in litigation at the
claim construction and infringement stages. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 24, at
852-68. I do not read Lemley’s focus on § 112 to exclude these possible alternatives.
49 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192.
50 Lemley, supra note 5, at 907.
51 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192-93.
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patentees to obtain broad claim scope through functional claiming.52 The next
part of this essay reviews the Federal Circuit’s decision and takes an initial
look at district court decisions applying it in order to see if it has brought us
any closer to solving the problems of patent scope that Lemley identifies in his
article.
II.

WILLIAMSON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Section 112(f) of the Patent Act permits patent claims to be written in what
is called means-plus-function format, stating that a claim element “may be
expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure.”53 If an element is written in means-plus-function format,
§ 112(f) requires the claim to be construed to cover only the corresponding
structure disclosed in the patent’s specification and the equivalents of that
structure.54 If an element is determined not to be drafted in means-plusfunction format, § 112(f) does not apply and the claim’s scope is not
necessarily limited to the structures disclosed in the specification. Finally, if an
element is written in means-plus-function format but the specification does not
disclose structure for performing the claimed function, the patent claim
containing that element is invalid as indefinite.55
Thus, determining whether a claim limitation has, in fact, been drafted in
means-plus-function format is critical to determining both the claim’s scope
and its validity.56 A key factor in making that threshold determination is

52 Lemley himself wrote an amicus brief urging the court to rehear the case en banc. See
Corrected Brief Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Professors in Support of En Banc
Review, Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 20131130), 2014 WL 7405154.
53 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). Before the America Invents Act, the subsections of § 112
were contained in a series of separate paragraphs, and the discussion of means-plus-function
claiming was found in paragraph 6. For consistency, I refer to the relevant subsection as
§ 112(f), even though many of the cases discussed, because they involve patents filed before
the America Invents Act, involve substantively identical § 112 ¶ 6.
54 Id.
55 See Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc. 675 F.3d 1302, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
56 In a separate contribution to this Symposium, John Duffy argues that this inquiry into
whether a limitation has been drafted in means-plus-function format is necessary only
because of the Federal Circuit’s misguided approach to claim construction. John F. Duffy,
Counterproductive Notice and Literalistic Versus Peripheral Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1197, 1209 (2016). Duffy asserts that the Federal Circuit, in allowing the literal language of
the claims to define the patent’s scope, has ignored older case law suggesting that a patent’s
scope should be limited to the embodiments disclosed in the specification and their
equivalents. Id. at 1207. Drawing on this older case law, Duffy argues that the admonition in
§ 112(f)—that claims containing means-plus-function elements should be construed to cover
only the structures disclosed in the specification—does nothing more than confirm that
those claims should be governed by the same interpretative rule that governs all patent
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whether the claim contains the word “means.” If it does, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the claim is a means-plus-function claim subject to § 112(f).57
Conversely, if the claim does not contain the word “means,” there is a
rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply.58
Beginning about ten years ago, the Federal Circuit strengthened the
presumption that § 112(f) does not apply if a claim does not include the word
“means,” characterizing the presumption as “strong” and “not readily
overcome.”59 Consequently, patent applicants, particularly in the software
industry, began to draft and obtain claims that were functional and lacked
structure, but that avoided the requirements of § 112(f) by omitting the term
“means.”60 For instance, rather than describing a software invention as a
“means for” performing some function, applicants drafted claims that used socalled nonce terms such as “system for” or “mechanism for” performing that
function.61 Or they claimed a computer “capable of” or “configured to”
perform a particular function.62 The advantage of this tactic to a patentee is
breadth: a claim that is not subject to § 112(f) will not be limited to the
structures recited in the specification and will not be found to be invalid simply
because the specification does not disclose a structure, such as a specific
algorithm, to perform the claimed function.63

claims, to wit, that the claims’ scope should be limited to the embodiments disclosed. Id. at
1210.
57 Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703-04
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
58 Id.
59 E.g., Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
60 Lemley, supra note 5, at 926-28.
61 See id. at 923. In patent argot, nonce terms are “substitutes for the word ‘means’ that
facially suggest structure but, in fact, merely describe function.” David J. Kappos &
Christopher P. Davis, Functional Claiming and the Patent Balance, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
365, 367 (2015). In more general usage, a nonce term is a word created for a particular
purpose. See Nonce, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2003). Examples include quark
(for the subatomic particle), grok (to understand), and, personal favorites of mine, embiggen
and cromulent, see The Simpsons: Lisa the Iconoclast (Fox television broadcast Feb. 18,
1996), as in “a noble spirit embiggens the smallest man” and “embiggen is a perfectly
cromulent word.” See generally Nonce Words, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Nonce_word [https://perma.cc/KSY2-EV9S].
62 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 926.
63 For evidence of patentees’ increasing use of nonce terms, see Dennis Crouch,
Functional Claim Language in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/functional-language-patents.html
[https://perma.cc/
9TVM-ALAP]. According to Crouch’s data, until about 1996, over 50% of patents included
an independent claim containing the phrase “means for.” Id. Today, that number is less than
10%. Id. Instead, nearly 50% of patents include a claim containing the phrase “for . . .ing”
(such as “for calculating”) without using the term “means,” up from about 30% in the mid-

1234

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1223

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Williamson restricts the ability of
patent applicants to avoid the strictures of § 112(f) by simply omitting the term
“means.” In the Williamson case, the Federal Circuit overruled the “strong”
presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to
§ 112(f).64 Although the presumption remains, the court emphasized that the
key inquiry is “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for
structure.”65 If the claim contains no structure, § 112(f) applies and the claim’s
scope will be limited to the structures in the specification.
The facts of Williamson illustrate how the § 112(f) analysis now works. The
patent-in-suit described methods and systems for “distributed learning,” which
essentially amounted to using standard computers linked by a network to create
a virtual classroom that connected a presenter to geographically remote
audience members.66 The claim limitation at issue recited a “distributed
learning control module for receiving communications transmitted between the
presenter and the audience member computer systems and for relaying the
communications to an intended receiving computer system and for
coordinating the operation of [a] streaming data module.”67
The district court treated the claim limitation as a means-plus-function
limitation subject to § 112(f), but a panel of the Federal Circuit reversed,
emphasizing that the district court “failed to give weight to the strong
presumption that [§ 112(f)] did not apply based on the absence of the word
‘means.’”68 On rehearing, the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court in relevant part, ruling that the “distributed learning control module”
limitation was subject to § 112(f).69 The Federal Circuit emphasized that the
claim was written in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function
claims, reciting a “module for [performing a function].”70 The court also
observed that the claim simply replaced the term “means” with “module”—“a
well-known nonce word.”71 The court then turned to the question of
indefiniteness. The patent’s specification, according to the court, made clear
that the claimed function must be performed on “a general purpose computer
programmed to perform particular functions.”72 In that circumstance, the
1990s. Id. And nearly 30% of patents now contain the phrase “configured to,” up from less
than 5% in the mid-1990s. Id.
64 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
relevant part).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1343.
67 Id. at 1344.
68 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
69 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1354.
70 Id. at 1350-51.
71 Id. at 1350.
72 Id. at 1352.
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specification must disclose an algorithm (that is, a sequence of steps or
operations73) for performing the claimed function.74 Because the specification
did not disclose an algorithm, the court held the patent claim to be invalid for
indefiniteness.75
Williamson should make it easier for accused infringers to show that
limitations that include nonce words such as “module” or “system” are subject
to § 112(f), meaning that they will be construed to cover only the structures
disclosed in the specification. Narrower claim constructions make it easier to
show noninfringement, and a broader applicability of § 112(f) offers expanded
opportunities to argue that a patent is invalid for failing to disclose structure to
perform a claimed function. Williamson thus pushes the law in the direction
sought by Lemley in Ready for Patenting: by subjecting a greater number of
patents to the requirement that they disclose structure, patent applicants will be
forced to build and test their invention so they can disclose that structure.
Moreover, as Lemley notes, a patentee who, in an effort to disclose the
required structure, provides only “prophetic examples” about how an invention
might work will be limited to those prophetic examples and forbidden from
claiming different, later-developed solutions that actually work.76
Whether the changes made by Williamson to the law of claim construction
are significant will be determined in large part by the federal district courts,
which confront claim construction issues more frequently and in greater
numbers than the Federal Circuit. Although this essay is not the place for a
comprehensive analysis of Williamson’s effects, several recent district court
cases are particularly noteworthy because the court in each case twice
considered whether § 112(f) applied to particular claim limitations—once
before Williamson and again after Williamson. Accordingly, those cases
provide useful clues about the likely consequences of the Federal Circuit’s
decision.
One consequence, as the facts of Williamson suggest, is that functional
claims that are particularly broad and vague will either be limited in scope or
invalidated. The Central District of California’s decision in Farstone
Technology, Inc. v. Apple Inc.77 illustrates this point. In that case, Farstone, the
patentee, alleged that the Time Machine features of Apple’s computers
infringed its patent, which involved technology that created a backup of data

73 Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, the Models Are Broken, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1986).
74 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d
1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
800 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical
formula, in prose, as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient
structure.”).
75 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1354.
76 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1193.
77 No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 5898273 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015).
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stored on a hard disk and enabled a user to later restore that data.78 The key
claim limitation recited “a processing system having at least one hardware
resource with a backup/recovery module, said backup/recovery module
creating at least one recovery unit to hold backup data.”79 In a claim
construction order issued before Williamson, the court rejected Apple’s
argument that the “processing system” limitation should be construed as a
means-plus-function limitation.80 The court noted the “strong presumption”
against means-plus-function claim construction when the term “means” is not
used and found that Apple had not rebutted that presumption.81 The court
reasoned that the claim referenced the “processing system” in structural terms,
as a portion of computer equipment with a hardware resource that included a
backup/recovery module.82
After Williamson, the court supplemented its prior claim construction order
and invalidated the claim as indefinite because “backup/recovery module” was
a means-plus-function element unsupported by structure.83 Analogizing to
Williamson, the court noted that “module” is a “well-known nonce word” that
substitutes for “means” and that the claim was drafted in a format consistent
with traditional means-plus-function limitations.84 The court also noted that the
claim did not impart any structural significance to the backup/recovery
module.85 It did not, for instance, “describe how the ‘backup/recovery module’
creates a recovery unit to hold backup data.”86 On the issue of validity, the
court, again like the en banc Federal Circuit in Williamson, observed that the
specification provided no algorithm for the function of creating a recovery unit
and thus held the claim to be invalid as indefinite.87
Farstone illustrates how courts can now subject many software patents to
the requirements of § 112(f)—and thereby narrow or invalidate them—by
simply analogizing to Williamson. Yet other recent decisions make clear that,
even after Williamson, not all limitations that contain nonce words and
functional language will be deemed to be means-plus-function limitations
subject to § 112(f). The decisions also show future patent applicants how to
draft around Williamson by simply including structural details in the patent

78

Id. at *1.
Id.
80 Farstone Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 857706 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 27, 2015).
81 Id. at *11.
82 Id. at *12.
83 Farstone Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 5898273, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 8, 2015).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at *5.
79
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claim itself, even if those details add little substance and therefore keep the
scope of the claim quite broad.
In M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc.,88 for example, the
District of Delaware ruled that a limitation containing the nonce term
“module”—the same term at issue in Williamson and Farstone—was not a
means-plus-function limitation, meaning that the patent would not be
invalidated for failing to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
function.89 The patent in that case related to wireless communication networks.
The relevant claim limitation recited, in the convoluted fashion familiar to
patent lawyers:
a processing module for authenticating an at least one transmission sent
from a programming transmitter and received by [a] programmable
communicator device, the at least one transmission including a coded
number and at least one telephone number or Internet Protocol (IP)
address corresponding to an at least one monitoring device, where the
processing module authenticates the at least one transmission by
determining if the at least one transmission contains the coded number,
the processing module authenticating the at least one transmission if the
transmission includes the coded number.90
Before the Federal Circuit decided Williamson, the district court in M2M
rejected the accused infringers’ argument that “processing module” was a
means-plus-function limitation, relying in part on decisions by other district
courts that “module” connotes sufficient structure to avoid the application of
§ 112(f).91
After Williamson, the accused infringers argued that the court should
reconsider its earlier ruling because, as in Williamson and Farstone, the claim
simply used “module” as a substitute for “means.”92 The court conceded that
“it is probably the case that the word ‘processing’ by itself fails to provide
sufficient structure in the term ‘processing module.’”93 However, in
reaffirming its earlier conclusion that § 112(f) did not apply, the court relied on
a declaration by the patentee’s expert stating that the claim language
surrounding the term “processing module” explains how the authenticating
function is to be performed.94 According to that declaration, the claim
disclosed a “simple three step algorithm”: “(1) identifying a coded number
contained in a received incoming transmission; (2) retrieving a coded number
stored locally in memory on the receiving device; and (3) comparing the coded

88
89
90
91
92
93
94

No. CV 12-30, 2015 WL 5826816 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
See id.
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number from the transmission with the coded number retrieved from memory
to determine whether they match.”95
M2M illustrates how future patent applicants can try to draft around
Williamson by merely including some details in the claim itself about how the
function is performed, even if the structure disclosed is, as the patentee’s own
expert stated in M2M, “simple.” That simple algorithm—which consists of
using coded numbers to identify devices on a particular network—could
conceivably be infringed by a wide array of wireless communication systems.
In another district court decision reconsidering a claim construction order
after Williamson, Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc.,96 the
Northern District of California, like the court in M2M, found claim language to
provide sufficient structure to avoid the application of § 112(f), even though
the structure disclosed was very straightforward, consisting primarily of
conventional computer hardware.97 The patent-in-suit described a computer
program that allows sellers of intellectual property to disclose information to
potential buyers while also maintaining control over the information.98 The
claim limitation at issue recited a “code segment” for performing various
functions including “receiving . . . electronic documents and an identity
validation at a server” from one party’s computer, receiving at the server an
identity validation from the counterparty’s computer, and “posting the received
electronic documents” on the server so that the counterparty can view them.99
Similar to the court in M2M, the court in Collaborative Agreements
emphasized that the claim language did “not simply describe broadly phrased
high-level functions.”100 Instead, the claim “describe[d] the objective and
operation of the code segment . . . while also describing the structural
interactions among the computer program’s code segment components.”101
Distinguishing Williamson, the court noted simply that “the claim language
describes the code segment’s operation with a degree of specificity not
present” in that case.102
Finally, in Magna Electronics, Inc. v. TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.,103
the Western District of Michigan, on a post-Williamson motion for
reconsideration, rejected the argument that a vehicular “crash avoidance
system” was a means-plus-function limitation.104 The court emphasized that
the claim recited structure, including a camera that included a lens and an
95

Id. at *4 n.4.
No. 15-CV-3853, 2015 WL 7753293 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015).
97 Id. at *9.
98 See id. at *1-2.
99 Id. at *2.
100 Id. at *5.
101 Id.
102 Id. at *6.
103 No. 1:12-CV-654 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016), ECF No. 674.
104 Id., slip op. at 11.
96

2016]

EARLY FILING AND FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING

1239

imager, a mounting element, a mechanism for mounting the system to the
windshield, and a module including a housing for the camera.105 Although the
court found those elements to provide sufficient structure to avoid § 112(f),
they are quite generic, consisting mainly of a camera inside of a housing
mounted to a car’s windshield. The patent in Magna Electronics could,
therefore, encompass a broad range of automobile safety systems.
Williamson, to be sure, closed a drafting loophole. Section 112(f), recall,
limits means-plus-function limitations to the specific structures disclosed in the
patent’s specification. And if the specification discloses no structure for
performing the function claimed in a means-plus-function limitation, the patent
claim is invalid. After Williamson, a patentee can no longer avoid those
narrowing (or invalidating) doctrines by simply omitting the term “means”
from its claims. Yet, as illustrated by M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and
Magna Electronics, patent claims that provide some detail about how a
claimed function is performed will still avoid application of § 112(f), even if
the implementing structure is relatively “simple,” as in M2M, consists
primarily of conventional computer hardware, as in Collaborative Agreements,
or is highly generic, like the camera, housing, and mounting element in Magna
Electronics.106
Of course, other factors may contribute to courts’ reluctance to reconsider
their prior claim constructions. Some courts apply a high bar for reconsidering
prior orders, even if there has been a change in the law.107 There are probably
anchoring effects, too. Not only are judges likely predisposed to adhere to prior
decisions, intervening events—such as a trial—can make the costs of
reconsideration unacceptably high.108

105

Id.
In addition to the cases discussed in the text, I have located one other decision in
which a district court denied a post-Williamson motion for reconsideration. The research in
this essay is current through January 2016. In Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-CV447, 2015 WL 4208754 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2015), the court ruled, in a case involving patents
on data storage and access systems, that claim limitations containing the terms “processor”
and “code” were not means-plus-function limitations. Id. at *3. The court noted that that the
accused infringer’s own experts had opined that those terms, on their own, connoted
structure to persons of ordinary skill in the art and that, in any case, the claims “include[d]
substantial additional language describing the operation of the components at issue and their
interaction with other components.” Id. (footnote omitted). Because of the court’s estoppellike reasoning, the case does not seem particularly significant to an analysis of Williamson’s
likely effects.
107 See, e.g., Magna Elecs., No. 1:12-CV-654, slip op. at 1-2 (stating that “the party
moving for reconsideration bears a ‘heavy’ burden to . . . ‘show that a different disposition
of the case must result’” from the change in governing law (quoting W.D. MICH. CIV. R.
7.4(a))).
108 For instance, at the time of the motion for reconsideration in Smartflash, see supra
note 106, a jury had already found that the patents were infringed and not invalid. See
106
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Or the decisions in M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and Magna
Electronics might simply be wrong.109 At a minimum, the cases illustrate the
wide discretion courts now have in deciding whether to apply § 112(f). Before
Williamson, Federal Circuit law provided a relatively bright-line rule: if a
claim did not contain the word “means,” § 112(f) was almost always irrelevant.
Now, the law is more standard-like, giving courts more leeway in deciding
whether to treat a limitation as a means-plus-function limitation. Although
Williamson offers courts a clear path for applying § 112(f) to many functional
claims, M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and Magna Electronics illustrate
how most patent claims will contain at least some structure that a court can
invoke to justify a conclusion that § 112(f) should not apply. Ultimately, it may
be up to the Federal Circuit, which generally reviews de novo the issue of
whether § 112(f) applies,110 to ensure consistency in the law. But the discretion
provided by Williamson could facilitate inconsistency among different panels
of the Federal Circuit—a phenomenon that already exists in other aspects of
Federal Circuit claim construction law.111
The decisions that refuse to apply § 112(f) also provide a roadmap for future
patent applicants to draft around Williamson. For instance, the patentee in
Williamson would have had a strong argument against applying § 112(f) if the
claim had succinctly explained how the distributed learning control module
worked, such as by receiving data at a server computer via a network from an
audience member’s computer and relaying the data via the network from the
server computer to the presenter’s computer.112 Those additional limitations,
one might argue, provide a simple, two-step algorithm that, like the algorithm
supposedly disclosed by the patent in M2M, provides structure (consisting

Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-CV-447, 2015 WL 4093132 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24,
2015).
109 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192-93 n.116.
110 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840-41 (2015)).
111 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004).
112 See Michael Risch, The Past and Future of Functional Claiming, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION (June 16, 2015), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-past-andfuture-of-functional.html [https://perma.cc/6FGV-JLLK] (observing that, in Williamson, the
patentee identified in the specification “figures that showed the input fields and the selection
of the intended computer systems” and suggesting that the patentee could have avoided
application of § 112(f) by adding to the claim “a paragraph that said: ‘get data from
audience client software and send data to a computer programmed to receive and process
such data (and located at the address selected from the list)’”). For a similar effort at
redrafting the claim from Williamson to avoid § 112(f), see Michael D. Stein, How
Structural Claim Limitations Can Save Software Patents, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/751757/how-structural-claim-limitations-can-savesoftware-patents [https://perma.cc/69Y5-ATCG] (conceding that one “could argue that the
limitations added to the claim are generic limitations inherent in any modern computer”).

2016]

EARLY FILING AND FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING

1241

mainly of conventional computer hardware, as in Collaborative Agreements)
and avoids application of § 112(f).113 To make the argument against applying
§ 112(f) even stronger, the applicant could easily add information about how
the server computer processes the data and coordinates the operation of the
entire system for conducting distributed learning, although that type of
information would begin to narrow the scope of the claim.
Because Williamson could prove easy to draft around, other doctrines—
particularly the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 of the Patent
Act—will remain important to curtailing overly broad patents. Since 2010, the
Supreme Court has applied the patentable subject matter requirement with
increased rigor, forbidding patents from covering “abstract ideas” merely
because those ideas are implemented on a computer. In Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International,114 for example, the Court invalidated patents on methods
and computer systems for ensuring that a party to a transaction will make
payment.115 And in Bilski v. Kappos116 the Court held unpatentable methods of
hedging financial risk that almost certainly would have been performed on a
computer.117 Thus, many computer-related patents, even if they are not subject
to § 112(f) under Williamson, remain vulnerable to § 101 validity challenges.
In this vein, one could argue that the patent in Collaborative Agreements,
although not narrowed or invalidated under § 112(f), is invalid under § 101
because, like the patents in Alice, it claims nothing more than the use of a
computer to solve a long-recognized problem: the risk that a party to a
transaction might later disclose sensitive information learned during
negotiations.118 Moreover, the patent in M2M, which claims a module that
113

For criticism of decisions that have found generic computer hardware and algorithmic
descriptions of function to be sufficient structure to avoid § 112(f), see Kevin Emerson
Collins, The Williamson Revolution in Software’s Structure, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 47, 54-55) (on file with author) (arguing that, after
Williamson, the Federal Circuit should either treat all software patents as lacking structure
and therefore subject to § 112(f) or articulate a new, stand-alone definition of structure to be
used in construing software patents).
114 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
115 Id. at 2358.
116 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
117 Id. at 611-12.
118 This problem embodies economist Kenneth Arrow’s famous information paradox:
one party has information to sell that is valuable only because it is secret, but no buyer
would purchase the information without a chance to inspect it. See Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECON. AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962). To my knowledge, § 101 issues have not been litigated in
Collaborative Agreements, although the accused infringer raised § 101 as a defense in its
answer. See Defendant’s Answer to Second Amended Complaint at 6, Collaborative
Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 15-CV-3853 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014), ECF No.
55.
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identifies, retrieves, and compares two numbers, resembles yet another patent
recently invalidated by the Supreme Court on § 101 grounds, which claimed
the steps of administering a drug to a patient, determining metabolite levels in
the bloodstream, and comparing those levels to ranges disclosed in the
patent.119 One could also argue that the patent in Magna Electronics fails § 101
because, like the patents in Alice and other pathmarking § 101 decisions, it
claims an abstract idea (avoiding car crashes) implemented through
conventional technology (a windshield mounted camera).120 And, as this essay
was going to press, the district court in Williamson (on remand from the
Federal Circuit) invalidated several other claims of the patent in that case for
failing to satisfy § 101.121 The invalidated claims included a claim to a
“method of conducting distributed learning” and a functional claim to a
“distributed learning server” that apparently disclosed enough structure to
avoid § 112(f).122 The court reasoned that the claims were directed to the
abstract idea of creating a virtual, interactive learning environment and that the
abstract idea was not patent eligible because it was implemented on industrystandard computer hardware and software.123
Interestingly, Lemley, in his prior writing on functional claiming, foresaw
precisely this interplay between means-plus-function claiming and § 101. Two
years before the Federal Circuit decided Williamson, he suggested that
functional claims that are not treated as means-plus-function claims subject to
§ 112(f) (and hence are not limited to the specific examples described in the
specification) will likely be invalid under § 101 because they are too abstract.
Accordingly, Lemley noted that restricting functional claiming would have the
unexpected effect of saving many software patents from invalidation.124

119 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98
(2012). Mayo, it should be noted, involved a patent on the diagnostic method itself, whereas
M2M involves a patent on an apparatus that performs a particular function, so the analogy is
not perfect. See M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless Am., Inc., No. CV 12-30, slip op. at
32 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016), ECF No. 247 (denying the accused infringer’s motion for
summary judgment of invalidity, which argued that the patent impermissibly claimed both
an apparatus and a method).
120 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-11 (“[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the [idea] to a particular technological
environment or adding insignificant postsolution activity.” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted))). To my knowledge, the patent
from the Magna Electronics case was not subjected to a § 101 challenge, and the case has
since settled. See Magna Elecs., Inc. v. TRW Auto. Holdings Corp., No. 1:12-CV-654
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2016), ECF Nos. 848-49.
121 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 11-CV-2409, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17,
2016), ECF No. 531.
122 Id. at 2-3.
123 Id. at 10, 12-13 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)).
124 Lemley, supra note 5, at 962-63.
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Having surveyed the post-Williamson case law, it seems likely that Lemley’s
predictions will prove correct.
CONCLUSION
Ready for Patenting offers a lucid explanation of a critical, notice-related
problem in patent law and clear and realistic prescriptions to help solve it. The
Federal Circuit in Williamson embraced one of Lemley’s recommendations by
curtailing the abuse of functional claiming. Under Williamson, means-plusfunction patentees will not be able to file early and obtain broad claim scope in
later litigation. Although patent applicants may be able to draft around
Williamson by providing generic structure that avoids application of § 112(f),
the decision—coupled with an invigorated requirement of patentable subject
matter under § 101—represents at least a small step toward ensuring that
patent law protects inventors who do the difficult work of building prototypes
and testing their ideas.

